Volume: 56.2

Vol. No. 56-2 Water Rights

By Emily Rogers and Chloe Fisher

Introduction

During Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) released water from its Lake Conroe reservoir into a portion of the San Jacinto River.1 Downstream property owners alleged their properties flooded as a result, asserting takings claims against SJRA under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (the Act).2 The Court of Appeals held in favor of SJRA, reversing the trial court’s denial of SJRA’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the plaintiffs’ statutory takings claim.3 This decision is likely to affect private property owners in Texas bringing statutory takings claims under the Act arising out of dam management during weather emergencies.

The Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act

The Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act authorizes private property owners to sue to determine whether a governmental action of a political subdivision results in a “taking” under Texas law.4 The Act defines “taking” to include governmental actions (1) affecting private real property that are compensable under the state or federal constitutions or (2) resulting in a reduction of at least 25% of market value of the affected real private property.5

Private property owners who succeed in obtaining “takings” determinations are entitled to judgment invalidating the governmental action at issue, including an assessment for money damages suffered and attorney’s fees.6 However, the Act does not require the governmental entity to pay those damages in all situations.7 Rather, the Act expressly provides governmental immunity for many categories of governmental action.8

Notably, one category of action triggering exclusion from payment based on governmental immunity is found in § 2007.003(b)(7) of the Act: “an action taken out of a reasonable good faith belief that the action is necessary to prevent a grave and immediate threat to life or property.”9 Though the Court of Appeals previously considered the applicability of this exclusion based on the pleadings, the Court had not previously considered § 2007.003(b)(7)’s general meaning or applied it to evidence.10 Chapter 2007 does not define the terms in § 2007.003(b)(7).11

San Jacinto River Authority v. Ross: An Overview

Created in 1937, SJRA is a political subdivision and a conservation and reclamation district of the State of Texas.12 SJRA’s responsibilities include “storing, controlling, and conserving storm and floodwaters of the San Jacinto River and its tributaries.”13 SJRA operates and maintains the dam across the West Fork of the San Jacinto River.14

Hurricane Harvey made landfall near Port Aransas on August 25, 2017, before re-entering the Gulf.15 As Harvey returned inland, its forward motion nearly stagnated, with the storm moving just five miles per hour.16 Severe flash flooding occurred through much of Harris and Montgomery Counties.17 On August 27, 2017, SJRA began releasing storm waters from Lake Conroe to the West Fork of the San Jacinto River.18 Many property owners in the Kingwood and Humble areas experienced devastating flooding.19 Following Harvey, the appellees (the Property Owners) sued SJRA in Harris County district courts, alleging that SJRA’s water release “inundated their properties with water and caused substantial damage.”20 The Property Owners asserted takings claims under the Texas Constitution and the Act.21 However, the Property Owners’ statutory takings claims under § 2007.003 of the Act were the only claims at issue for the purposes of this appeal.22

The Court’s Decision in Ross to Exempt SJRA from Takings Liability

SJRA argued that the trial court erred in denying its plea to jurisdiction in part because its actions were exempt from takings liabilities under § 2007.003(b)(7)’s emergency exclusion. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals began by defining the words of § 2007.003(b)(7) by looking to their ordinary meanings.23 The Court’s definitions are as follows:

“Action”

The term “action” refers to the challenged act or acts put into issue by the plaintiffs’ pleadings.24

“Reasonable Good Faith”

The term “reasonable good faith”—as applied to a dam operator like SJRA—means that “the governmental entity believed that the challenged action was necessary to prevent a grave and immediate threat to life or property, and that its belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable dam operator.”25

“Necessary”

The word “necessary” includes something that is essential or needed for some purpose.26

“Grave and Immediate”

“Grave” means “likely to produce great harm or danger” or “significantly serious.”27 “Immediate” means “near to or related to the present” or “of or relating to the here and now.”28

Application

Mindful of these definitions, the Court considered whether the record established the exclusion. The Court looked to SJRA employee testimonies in the record on risk, adherence to floodgate policy, and goals when releasing water from the lake; hydrology expert testimony; and engineering expert testimony in making its determination.29

The Court held that SJRA met its burden to establish the exclusion.30 The Court first examined whether Harvey presented a “grave and immediate threat.” It pointed to uncontroverted evidence filed by the Property Owners that illustrated Harvey’s severity, including that, according to the Harris County Flood Control District’s final report, four-day rainfall totals over the Kingwood area were likely to occur only once every 2,000-5,000 years.31 Given this evidence, the Court concluded that Harvey presented a grave and immediate threat to life and property.32

Next, the Court examined whether SJRA presented evidence (1) that it believed that releasing water in accordance with its floodgate policy was necessary to prevent the threat posed and, if so, (2) whether its belief was objectively reasonable. Here, the Court looked to SJRA’s general manager’s testimony on its intent and objectives when deciding to release water during storm events, as outlined in the organization’s floodgate policy.33 Given that the floodgate policy was designed to reduce downstream flooding, comport with applicable laws, and ensure that the dam does not fail or cause catastrophic flooding downstream, the Court determined that SJRA had the requisite belief.34 The Court then concluded that SJRA’s belief was objectively reasonable, given that, generally, “governmental entity’s actions taken with intent to comply with valid laws and legal authority are objectively reasonable.”35

The Court rejected the Property Owners’ argument that fact questions existed as to whether SJRA reasonably and in good faith believed that releasing the water was necessary to prevent a grave and immediate threat to life or property.36 Specifically, the Court noted that the Property Owners’ allegations regarding SJRA’s (1) intent to avoid upstream flooding; (2) failure to meet floodgate policy goals; (3) reliance on a case the Property Owners contend was decided incorrectly and that the Court had declined to follow; and (4) release of more water than essential did not present fact issues.37

Consequently, the Court concluded that the § 2007.003(b)(7) exclusion applied. Given that the exclusion applied, the Court held that the trial court erred in denying SJRA’s plea to the jurisdiction.38 The Court reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment dismissing the Property Owners’ statutory takings claims under § 2007.003(b)(7), with prejudice.39

The Impact of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in Ross

Though the Court’s holding is binding only within its jurisdictional limits, the decision has statewide implications on statutory takings liability arising under the Act out of dam management during weather emergencies. The decision provides insight into how other appellate courts or the Supreme Court of Texas might construe § 2007.003(b)(7) following similar claims. It may therefore be harder for private property owners to receive compensation under § 2007.003(b)(7), as the Court in Ross was reluctant to find fact issues in the face of expert and employee testimony showing a reasonable good faith belief that releasing the water was necessary to prevent a grave and immediate threat to life or property.

 

Emily Rogers is the managing partner at Bickerstaff Heath Delgado Acosta LLP and practices in the areas of water and environmental law. She has extensive experience representing cities, river authorities, and water districts in matters involving surface and groundwater rights, water and wastewater utility matters, and industrial and municipal solid waste disposal cases. Emily earned her B.A. in History from the University of Texas, her M.A. in History from Southwest Texas State University, and her J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center.

Chloe Fisher is a recent graduate of the University of Texas School of Law. Chloe is from Houston, Texas, and she received her B.A. in Sustainability Studies & Philosophy from UT Austin. She joined TELJ during her first year of law school and served as Editor-in-Chief of Volume 56.

 

  1. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Ross, No. 14-23-00923-CV, 2025 WL 2934051, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 16, 2025, no pet. filed.).
  2. Id. at *2.
  3. Id. at *16.
  4. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.021(1).
  5. Id. § 2007.002(5).
  6. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2021) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2007.006(a), 2007.021, 2007.023(b), 2007.024(b), 2007.026(a)).
  7. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.024(c).
  8. Id. § 2007.003(b).
  9. Id. § 2007.003(b)(7).
  10. Ross, 2025 WL 2934051, at *4 (citing Medina, 627 S.W.3d, at 628–31).
  11. Id. at *5.
  12. Id. at *1 (citing Medina, 627 S.W.3d at 621).
  13. Id. (citing Medina, 627 S.W.3d at 621) (internal quotes omitted).
  14. Id.
  15. Ross, 2025 WL 2934051, at *1.
  16. Id.
  17. Id.
  18. Id.
  19. Id.
  20. Id. at *2.
  21. Id.
  22. Id.
  23. Id. at *5.
  24. Ross, 2025 WL 2934051, at *5.
  25. Id. at *6.
  26. Id.
  27. Id. (quoting Grave, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2026), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/grave [https://perma.cc/F85Y-55E2]).
  28. Id.
  29. Ross, 2025 WL 2934051, at *6–*9.
  30. Id.
  31. Id. at *9.
  32. Id. at *10.
  33. Id.
  34. Id.
  35. Ross, 2025 WL 2934051, at *10 (citing City of Houston v. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Aacen v. San Juan Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 944 F.2d 691, 701 (10th Cir. 1991)).
  36. Ross, 2025 WL 2934051, at *13.
  37. Id. at *13–*15.
  38. Id. at *16.
  39. Id.

Vol. No. 56-2 Water Quality

Regulating Forever Chemicals: The Clean Water Act and PFAS

By: Alisha Adams and Blair Buchanan

Introduction

The Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”) has served as the primary federal statute for protecting the waters of the United States for over fifty years. The Act’s primary objective “is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”[1] Although the Act has proven effective in mitigating traditional pollutants, it now confronts a contemporary, and particularly challenging, class of contaminants: per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”).

Commonly referred to as “forever chemicals” due to their ability to persist in the environment and human body, PFAS are a class of synthetic chemicals used in industrial and consumer products that aid with resistance to moisture, grease, stains, and fire.[2] These substances have been linked to a range of adverse health outcomes and have been widely detected in soil, surface water, and drinking water.[3] Despite the CWA providing the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with robust regulatory mechanisms, such as National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits and Effluent Limitation Guidelines (“ELGs”), federal action that meaningfully addresses PFAS has historically been limited.[4]

This article examines the application of the CWA to PFAS and assesses recent regulatory developments regarding these substances. Part I provides background on the chemical properties, uses, and risks associated with PFAS. Part II analyzes the CWA’s mechanisms as they pertain to PFAS. Part III highlights recent federal regulatory activities and policy developments concerning PFAS under the CWA framework.

1. PFAS

PFAS are a large group of synthesized chemical compounds characterized by a fluoroalkyl chain in which carbon atoms are bonded to fluorine atoms.[5] This carbon-fluorine bond is one of the strongest bonds in nature, making these chemicals exceptionally resistant to heat, water, grease, and stains, while simultaneously making them immune to biodegradation.[6] As a result, PFAS remain highly persistent in their environment.

PFAS’ ability to resist moisture, grease, and fire has made them enticing chemicals for use in a variety of products. For example, since the 1940s, PFAS have been used in non-stick cookware, food packaging, mobile phones, cosmetics, and the aqueous film-forming foams used in firefighting.[7] Today, PFAS are used in many everyday household products, including kitchen and food packaging, household cleaners and paints, water-resistant clothing, carpets, furniture fabrics, mattresses, and personal care products like dental floss, waterproof cosmetics, sunscreen, and nail polish.[8]

PFAS have also become nearly ubiquitous in the environment, appearing in soil, surface water, the atmosphere, and the blood of more than 97 percent of Americans.[9] Specifically, the PFAS released into the environment during manufacturing, use, and disposal persist for decades.[10] Notably, these substances are also mobile in water, and surface waters have been found to contain some of the highest PFAS concentrations.[11]

Exposure to PFAS has been linked to an array of adverse health effects, including cancer, liver damage, immune system suppression, and growth defects in children.[12] Research has also linked PFAS exposure to obesity, insulin resistance, and thyroid malfunction.[13] These cumulative health risks, combined with PFAS’s persistence and bioaccumulation potential, underscore the urgency of addressing their presence in the environment. The environmental distribution of PFAS also raises significant environmental justice concerns, as the industrial facilities and airports that serve as point sources for these substances are disproportionately located near low-income communities and communities of color.[14]

2. Applying the Clean Water Act to PFAS

Enacted in 1972, the CWA establishes the basic federal framework for regulating pollutant discharges into United States waters. The Act defines “pollutant” broadly to include substances, such as chemical and industrial wastes, sewage, and biological materials, that are discharged into the nation’s water,[15] granting EPA the authority to regulate diverse point-source discharges from industrial, municipal, and other facilities.[16] The CWA also establishes two primary regulatory mechanisms: the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program and Effluent Limitation Guidelines (“ELGs”).[17]

The NPDES program requires facilities to obtain permits before discharging pollutants from point sources into United States waters.[18] NPDES permits establish enforceable limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that may be discharged, while also typically including monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements that are designed to ensure compliance, protect water quality, and maintain human health.[19] These permits may also outline ideal management practices or other operational requirements aimed to minimize environmental harms.[20]

In addition to permitting requirements, the CWA employs technology-based ELGs, which set the maximum levels of pollutants that facilities within specific industrial categories may discharge.[21] ELGs are based on the performance of available pollution control technologies and are incorporated into individual NPDES permits.[22] While facilities are not required to implement the specific technologies identified in ELGs, they must comply with these guidelines’ established discharge limits.[23]

Although the CWA’s regulatory system has significantly reduced conventional industrial pollution, the Act faces structural limitations that hinder its responsiveness to emerging contaminants like PFAS. For example, developing or revising ELGs can be a slow and resource-intensive process.[24] Before establishing new limits, EPA must gather data regarding the prevalence and sources of specific pollutants, evaluate available treatment technologies, and assess the economic implications of those technologies.[25]

These challenges are particularly acute for PFAS, which present distinct regulatory hurdles. Unlike more discrete pollutants, PFAS comprise a class of over 9,000 chemicals, many of which are proprietary and remain poorly understood.[26] As a result, regulators often lack comprehensive data[27] and must then rely on industry-reported information, complicating efforts to establish uniform standards.[28] Historically, the absence of standardized testing methods and consistent federal requirements has also produced a fragmented, state-by-state reporting regime, leaving significant gaps in nationwide data.[29] Together, these factors delay the development of comprehensive regulatory standards and illustrate how difficult it is to apply the CWA framework to complex and evolving chemical classes, like PFAS.

Additionally, the CWA requires EPA to balance the costs of achieving effluent reductions with the corresponding environmental benefits when setting technology-based ELGs.[30] While this approach reflects Congress’s effort to balance environmental protection with economic feasibility, it can further slow regulatory action when costs are uncertain or politically contested.[31] In the case of PFAS, industry opposition and debate over the economic implications of broad controls have significantly shaped regulatory efforts, particularly given the widespread use of these chemicals across multiple sectors and the potential costs of compliance.[32] These structural and informational constraints explain why the CWA may struggle to address emerging contaminants like PFAS.

3. Recent Regulatory Developments on PFAS under the CWA

As synthetic chemical compounds that can enter waterways through industrial and wastewater discharges, PFAS fall squarely within the CWA’s broad definition of “pollutant.” However, the lack of PFAS-specific ELGs has constrained EPA’s use of the CWA as a regulatory tool to combat PFAS pollution.[33] Although EPA possesses the authority to regulate PFAS, meaningful regulatory action has been limited, reflecting both the slow pace of ELG development and limited data on PFAS’s occurrence and toxicity.[34]

In 2019, EPA initiated a series of efforts aimed at addressing PFAS-related informational and regulatory gaps, signaling a shift toward greater engagement with the substances under the CWA. EPA’s 2019 PFAS Action Plan outlined short- and long-term goals,[35] which were subsequently elaborated on in the agency’s 2021 PFAS Strategic Roadmap.[36] These strategies emphasized research, monitoring, and regulatory development, and they were eventually completed with a 2022 guidance memorandum addressed to the states, which explicitly described how NPDES permits could be used to reduce PFAS pollution.[37]

Consistent with this emphasis on data generation and monitoring, EPA finalized analytical methods for detecting PFAS in wastewater and other environmental media in 2024, and the agency published its science-based water quality concentrations and benchmarks for ten PFAS to guide state and tribal efforts to protect aquatic life.[38] These water quality concentrations encompass EPA’s recommended criteria; however, they are not regulatory and do not impose legally binding requirements.[39]

EPA has since taken additional steps to translate these priorities into practice, primarily by continuing to expand its monitoring and data collection requirements. In 2025, the agency issued a draft Multi-Sector General Permit (“MSGP”) that would require operators in twenty-three industrial sectors to monitor forty PFAS compounds in areas where EPA has NPDES permitting authority.[40] Simultaneously, EPA developed methods to detect forty PFAS compounds in wastewater, surface water, groundwater, soil, and sludge, supporting future permit requirements and regulatory revisions.41] The agency also signaled its intent to update NPDES permits to require the monitoring and reporting of PFAS in November 2025, but this proposal has not yet been issued.[42] Moving forward, EPA plans to propose revisions to the Organic Chemicals, Plastics, and Synthetic Fibers (“OCPSF”) ELGs in 2026, a category that will include PFAS.[43]

Taken together, these efforts reflect a regulatory strategy that prioritizes information gathering and incrementally integrating PFAS into existing CWA mechanisms, rather than immediately establishing enforceable discharge limits. While this approach has expanded the scientific and technical foundation for future regulation, it has also prolonged the absence of binding ELGs, leaving significant PFAS discharges unregulated. Accordingly, EPA’s recent actions illustrate the CWA framework’s adaptability and limitations: although the statute can accommodate emerging contaminants, its reliance on data- and resource-intensive processes may delay meaningful regulatory intervention despite widespread and persistent pollution.

Conclusion

The regulation of PFAS under the CWA illustrates the structural and practical challenges EPA faces in addressing emerging contaminants. Although the Act provides EPA with the broad authority and flexible regulatory tools capable of addressing PFAS, the absence of enforceable effluent limits, combined with historically limited data, has constrained meaningful intervention and allowed contamination to persist. EPA’s recent shift toward a more monitoring-intensive approach reflects an important effort to build the scientific foundation necessary for regulation. However, this change underscores the limitations of an incremental strategy that prioritizes data collection over immediate controls. Without the timely development of binding discharge limits and due to their widespread use, PFAS pollution is likely to continue. To fulfill the CWA’s core objective of protecting the integrity of the nation’s waters, EPA should move beyond monitoring and guidance and toward the establishment of concrete, enforceable limits on PFAS discharges.

 

Alisha Adams is an attorney in the Environmental and Regulatory section of Jackson Walker’s Austin office. She is experienced in regulatory and complex environmental litigation matters in both state and federal courts and in arbitration proceedings, including identification and mitigation of environmental risks, navigating the permitting processes, and defending clients in administrative enforcement actions.

Blair Buchanan is a recent graduate of the University of Texas School of Law. While in law school, Blair researched many topics related to environmental and administrative law, including NEPA litigation and policy under Prof. David Adelman.

 

 

[1] 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

[2] Jackson D. Vause, PFAS in Charleston S.C.: A Review of Pollution, Regulatory Issues and Potential Solutions, 75 S.C.L. Rev. 759, 761 (2024). The Environmental Protection Agency’s PFAS datasets have identified and labeled over 12,000 substances as PFAS in the United States. Gar N. Lauerman & Scott M. Seaman, An Updated Primer on PFAS/Forever Chemical Claims: Regulation, Litigation, Large Losses, and Insurance Coverage Issues, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP (Nov. 14, 2024), https://www.hinshawlaw.com/newsroom-updates-insights-for-insurers-pfas-forever-chemical-regulation-litigation-insurance-coverage.html [https://perma.cc/GYK3-MVVH]; Maria-Eleni Dimitrakopoulou et al., Comprehensive Analysis of PFAS Presence from Environment to Plate, 8 npj Sci. Food art. no. 80, at 2 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41538-024-00319-1.

[3] Our Current Understanding of the Human Health and Environmental Risks of PFAS, Env’t Prot. Agency (July 14, 2026), https://www.epa.gov/pfas/our-current-understanding-human-health-and-environmental-risks-pfas [https://perma.cc/6LZU-V6KB].

[4] Recent EPA actions signal a shift toward a more assertive use of CWA authority to regulate PFAS discharges. However, EPA has not designated any PFAS as toxic pollutants or hazardous substances. Vause, supra note 2, at 770.

[5] Lauerman & Seaman, supra note 2.

[6] See What Are PFAS Compounds and How Can We Test for Them?, Enviroforensics (Apr. 30, 2026), https://www.enviroforensics.com/blog/what-are-pfas-compounds-and-how-can-we-test-for-them/ [https://perma.cc/WJ3U-FG6Z].

[7] Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 3.

[8] Id.

[9] Nat’l Inst. of Env’t Health Scis., Perfluoroalkyl and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) (Mar. 6, 2026), https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/pfc [https://perma.cc/3PY7-XL77].

[10] PFAS and Food Packaging – FAQ, CHEMTrust, https://chemtrust.org/pfas-food-packaging-faq/ [https://perma.cc/4WPC-ELEE] (last visited Sept. 8, 2026).

[11] Dimitrakopoulou et al., supra note 2, at 1.

[12] Carol Kwiatkoski et al., Scientific Basis for Managing PFAS as a Chemical Class, 7 Env’t Sci. & Tech. Lett. 532 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.estlett.0c00255.

[13] Lore Jane L. Espartero et al., Health-Related Toxicity of Emerging Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances: Comparison to Legacy PFOS and PFOA, 212 Env’t Rsch. art. no. 113431, at  3 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2022.113431.

[14] Vause, supra note 2, at 765–66.

[15] 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2018).

[16] See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

[17] NPDES Permit Basics, Env’t Prot. Agency (July 22, 2026), https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/YFD2-NQYW]; Effluent Guidelines Plan, Env’t Prot. Agency (Nov. 25, 2025),  https://www.epa.gov/eg/effluent-guidelines-plan [https://perma.cc/53UE-EYU9].

[18] Summary of the Clean Water Act, Env’t Prot. Agency (Feb. 23, 2026), https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/88DJ-8W3A].

[19] Env’t Prot. Agency, NPDES Permit Basics, supra note 17.

[20] Id.

[21] PFAS manufacturers and formulators fall under the Organic Chemicals, Plastics, and Synthetic Fibers (OCPSF) category. Organic Chemicals, Plastics, and Synthetic Fibers Effluent Guidelines, Env’t Prot. Agency (May 8, 2026), https://www.epa.gov/eg/organic-chemicals-plastics-and-synthetic-fibers-effluent-guidelines [https://perma.cc/T8H9-WV48].

[22] Where EPA has not established ELGs for a particular pollutant or industry category, permitting authorities may impose limits on a case-by-case basis using their “best professional judgment.” Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45998, Contaminants of Emerging Concern Under the Clean Water Act 14 (2019).

[23] Federal PFAS Regulation: 2025 Activities and 2026 Anticipated Actions, BCLP (Feb. 17, 2026), https://www.bclplaw.com/en-US/events-insights-news/federal-pfas-regulation-2025-activities-and-2026-anticipated-actions.html [https://perma.cc/D3R8-B8DM].

[24] Vause, supra note 2, at 777.

[25] Id.

[26] Espartero et al., supra note 13, at 2, 4.

[27] While certain legacy compounds, such as perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) (used in non-stick cookware, stain-resistant fabrics, and firefighting foams) and perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (“PFOS”) (used to make products stain-, grease-, and water-resistant) have been heavily studied, most of the emerging PFAS substitutes remain understudied. Espartero et al., supra note 13, at 4.

[28] See Vause, supra note 2, at 777.

[29] PFAS Analytic Tools, Env’t Prot. Agency (Feb. 4, 2026), https://echo.epa.gov/trends/pfas-tools [https://perma.cc/BWP3-24NX].

[30] The determination of whether to revise ELGs is subject to a cost benefit analysis on “the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived.” 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b).

[31] Vause, supra note 2.

[32] See, e.g., Natalie Balbuena and Mia DiFelice, The Multi-Million-Dollar Effort to Sway Lawmakers on PFAS, Food & Water Watch (Nov. 7, 2023), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/2023/11/07/pfas-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/MM4T-GF8R].

[33] See Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12148, Regulating PFAS Under the Clean Water Act (2026).

[34]  See Richard Leahy, PFAS and the EPA Strategic Roadmap: Progress and Challenges, Harv. L. Sch., Env’t. & Energy L. Program (Jan. 13, 2025), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/pfas-and-the-epa-strategic-roadmap-progress-and-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/4L54-XFTE].

[35] Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA’s Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Action Plan 2–7 (Feb. 2019), https://19january2021snapshot.epa.gov/sites/static/files/2019-02/documents/pfas_action_plan_021319_508compliant_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5VB-AQSE].

[36] Env’t Prot. Agency, PFAS Strategic Roadmap: EPA’s Commitments to Action 2021–2024 (Oct. 2021), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-10/pfas-roadmap_final-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UGP-38BC].

[37] See Memorandum from Env’t Prot. Agency Assistant Administrator Radhika Fox on PFAS Discharges in NPDES Permits and the Pretreatment Program and Monitoring Programs to Env’t Prot. Agency Regional Water Division Directors (Dec. 5, 2022), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-12/NPDES_PFAS_State%20Memo_December_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UAE-FRBW].

[38] Final Recommended Aquatic Life Criteria and Benchmarks for Select PFAS, 89 Fed. Reg. 81077 (Oct. 7, 2024).

[39] Key EPA Actions to Address PFAS, Env’t Prot. Agency (July 1, 2026), https://www.epa.gov/pfas/key-epa-actions-address-pfas [https://perma.cc/G5EY-FFJG].

[40] BCLP, supra note 23.

[41] Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 39; BCLP, supra note 23.

[42] BCLP, supra note 23.

[43] BCLP, supra note 23.